Although a plenty of studies on international joint ventures (IJVs) has been done by previous scholars, investigation from corporate governance perspective is still preliminary. It is supposed that governing IJV will be more problematic since there is a double-accountability in IJV's management, i.e. the management need to be accountable to at least two owners/parent companies. Considering the weakness of foreign owner's governing capability affected by the remoteness, using equity ownership control would be a optimal choice. Therefore, this research has empirically investigated the foreign equity ownership in IJVs within Chinese business environment. After investigation, this paper proposes that IJV dominantly owned by one partner will be prevail in its governance practice, and in fact the majority owner of successfully operated IJVs in China is always attributed to the foreign partner. The author used 'transaction cost approach' and 'bargaining power theory' to explain such phenomenon. The research method employs a qualitative approach, i.e. in-depth interview and substantive case study.
Introduction
Since the start of its economic reform in 1978, China has made worldly outstanding achievements. In 2004, through measuring on the purchasing power parity (PPP), China has become the second largest economic power in the world, which is only next to USA. China's total GDP equals to US$ 7.262 trillion and the GDP growth rate is 9.1% in 2004 (CIA, 2005). After stride into this new century, China has encountered a variety of new opportunities for strengthening its transition, such as China's accession of World Trade Organization (WTO), Beijing becoming the host of the 2008 Olympic games, etc. In the meantime, the improvement of advanced technologies in China also shows to the world with an active image. For instance, China successfully entered into intergalactic elite in 2003, which is the third country after Russia and USA to achieve such incredible brilliance.
Jinag
Being a predominant component of China's economic reform, foreign direct investment (FDI) has played a significant role in terms of accelerating national economic growth, developing emerging market economic system, and propelling the China's globalization process within the last twenty-eight-years. In accordance with statistical data, P.R.C has already surpassed the USA to become the world ' In conjunction with the globalization and market liberalization, IJVs in China are emerged as one of the most popular organizational form and hence inevitably involve into the requirement of healthy corporate governance system (Dussauge and Garrette, 1999). Nevertheless, there is a lack of empirical study of how corporate governance works in IJVs within this worldly largest emerging economy. Consequently, study of CG in IJVs will offer us with an opportunity of extending our current understanding and application of corporate governance in many layers. Because of the equity ownership distribution implies the governing power owned by each partner, corporate governance in IJVs mainly correlates to equity ownership control. In the meantime, since IJV is a cross-country arrangement and the foreign partner encounters many difficulties in governing its joint venture that is caused by remoteness, equity ownership control in IJV is supposed to have more importance than normal organizations. This study tries to explore whether or not the foreign partners/owners acquire controlling equity ownership for exercising their governing power in IJVs and how such governing approach is affected by the ongoing operations of IJVs.
Literature Review
Over the past three decades, the global revolution in terms of Hi-Tech and internationalization dramatically changes business environment. For enhancing their competitiveness, companies are encouraged to form international/domestic strategic alliance for achieving some economic goals, such as reducing investment risks, sharing technology and expertise, improving operational efficiency, and strengthening global competitiveness, etc (Harrigan, 1988 ).
Williamson (1991b) extends the explanation of transaction cost approach into strategic alliances domain, in which he calls this organization form as "hybrid form" (Williamson, 1991b) . According to transaction costs theory, because of much uncertainty involved, the ownership selection of foreign firms will depend on the costs and benefits of sharing ownership (i.e. equity joint ventures) relative to those of full ownership (i.e. wholly foreign owned enterprises) (Hennart, 1988; Contractor, 1989) . Transaction costs occur in forming strategic alliances due to human behavior factors such as opportunism, bounded rationality, lack of trust, and other environmental factors such as a lack of alternative partners due to a small number of bargaining firms (Kogut, 1988a (Kogut, , 1988b Parkhe, 1993a ).
There are two factors affecting the transaction costs when firms make a decision in terms of entry new country. Firstly, the uncertainty of economic and political conditions and the government policies in host country are regarded as crucial to the survival and profitability of a foreign investor's operations in that country (Agarwal, 1992) . Second, cultural distance many affect the control mode selected by the firm. For example, Anand and Delios (1997) found that high level of cultural difference will increase the management costs in terms of communication and negotiation within alliances, and therefore the foreign firms may pursue high level of ownership and control in their alliances (Anand and Delios, 1997).
As an international arrangement of equity strategic alliance, IJVs represent an effective way to cope with the increasingly competitive business environment. In accordance with transaction cost theory, the need for formatting international joint ventures will be particularly strong in four instances. The first is when the joint venture's operation represents a diversification for the parent firms, i.e., the joint venture may manufacture a product that is not produced by the parent firms. This situation has been evidenced by Stopford and Haberich's study (Stopford and Haberich, 1978) . The second situation might exist when a firm enters into a foreign country for the first time. Because such firm may lack the knowledge of local political, economical, institutional and sociological conditions and consequently its transaction will subject to high costs. Therefore, it would expect to form joint venture in order to acquire such knowledge (Inkpen, 1998) . Thirdly, foreign firms may also engage in forming joint ventures to obtain access to the local resources that have been controlled by local firms. This is mostly to be the case in natural resource industries. Gomes-Casseres's (1996) study of ownership policies of US firms showed that local government policies discourage or prohibit full ownership by foreigners in those industries (Gomes-Casseres, 1996). Thus, if these resources are necessary for the foreign companies, the best economic way is to cooperate with the local firms (Gomes-Casseres, 1996). Finally, international joint ventures can provide a vehicle for the parent firms to combine complementary inputs (for instance, know-how, management or market expertise) held by two separate firms. So when the market for both of these inputs is subject to high transaction costs, formation of joint ventures is emerged as appropriate way (Tyebjee, 1988 ).
In addition, culture distance may also lead the foreign firms to choose joint venture as an entry mode. Wada (2001) found that culture distance between Japan and Unite States is very large, consequently, Japanese investor have avoided full acquisitions, preferring entry through joint ventures or partial acquisition, because of the high transaction costs of merging the acquired firm's past management practices (Wada, 2001 ).
There are many advantages of IJVs' formation reported by previous scholars, such as Harrigan (1988) indicates that joint venture is a better way for firms to enter a highly uncertain environment (Harrigan, 1988 : 145)i; proposes that joint venture provide a platform for organization learning ii; etc. In the meantime, researchers also point out that IJV is a difficult form of strategic alliance to manage because it involves shared equity ownership and control (Beamish, 1988 ; Inkpen and Beamish, 1997; Hennart, Roehl, and Zietlow, 1999; Parkhe, 1991; Geringer, 1991).
As proposed by the transaction costs theory, the transaction costs may increase due to partners' opportunistic behavior. Joint ventures' formation and performance are obstructed by perceptions of opportunistic behavior by participating firms (Parkhe, 1993a) . Opportunism refers to the tendency of partner firms to maximize their gains at the expense of other partners or the joint ventures. When a foreign firm possesses the ability to develop new products, it may have the risk of losing long-term profits if it shares this knowledge with host country firms. The reason is that the host country firms may acquire this knowledge and decide to operate as a separate entity in the future (Agarwal, 1992) . Therefore, the foreign partners will rely on the legal system in host country to protect their benefit. It will require the host country to enhance its institutional environment for corporate governance. In transitional or emerging market, such as China, this requirement may become more critical for the success of IJVs since the foreign investors will face the challenges of national structural reform, imperfect market system, poor intellectual right protection, and institutional uncertainty (Luo, 1997: 649) iii .
As a destination of foreign direct investment, China has a particular combined economic system, which consists of a market economy and a centrally planned economy. There are some disadvantages of centrally planned economy, such as weak capital market structure, poorly specified property rights, and institutional instability (Li, 1998) . Meanwhile, China's industrial structure is unbalanced and some of the Chinese enterprises still receive protection from the government, especially for the firms in 'Pillar Industry', which means such enterprises will directly affect the national strengths in China. Therefore, the institutional environment in China provides a difficult situation for foreign owners to govern their IJVs.
For attracting more oversea investment, the Chinese legal regime for foreign investment has been significantly changed since the China implements its state policy of opening to the outside world. The development of Chinese laws and regulations on foreign investment in China over the past twenty years reflect a balance between encouraging foreign business investment and the desire to maintain state controls iv Control is an important issue in the capability of an organization to achieve its goals, therefore it represents a large issue in IJVs' literatures. In respect to the relationship between control and performance, Killing (1983) asserted that among his three JV categories (majority ownership control, shared ownership control, minority ownership control), dominant partner JVs are more likely to be successful since the IJVs' activities dominated by a single parent will be easier to manage and consequently more possible to be successful (Killing, 1983) . Meanwhile, in accordance with transaction costs theory, dominant control can reduce the risks of coordination, potential conflicts and disclosures. As a result, it can minimize transaction costs and stabilize the IJVs (Beamish, 1995) .
The issues about IJVs' control become more complicated in China due to its economic and political conditions. In Sino-foreign joint ventures, technology in research and development (R&D), expertise in management, marketing, and finance are mostly to be occupied by the foreign partner. In order to improve their competitiveness or market power, foreign partners need to control some major functional areas ( Because people living in a same country tend to have similar values, and thus they will bring these values to the organizations for which they work, including international joint ventures. As a result, firm's values are largely reflected by its national culture. Therefore, IJVs' parents based in different countries will tend to have different values. Those differences will make it more difficult to achieve common goals, to solve problems, and to handle conflicts (Hofstede, 1980 (Hofstede, & 1997 Since this research involves 'How' and 'Why' issues, it seems only experiment, historical analysis, and case study methods can be applicable. However, the experimental strategy is not available in this research since the experimental situation is difficult to be controlled in this study. Meanwhile, the historical approach is also not appropriate. Therefore, the case study method becomes the optimal choice. The case study method has been widely employed in conducting scientific research in the filed of social phenomenon (Mintzberg & Walters, 1982; Pettigrew, 1992) . Some scholars advocate that researchers directly involve in investigations within firms are absolutely essential if they intend to do contextually plenteous research (Daft, 1983; Gummesson, 1991; Yin, 1994) . The case study approach will be particularly applicable when the research attempts to cover the contextual conditions that are highly complicated to the phenomenon under investigation. Hence, the research methodological approach of this study employs a qualitative approach, namely through field observation and individual interview, a theory-guided exploratory multiple-case study method has been applied.
Analysis of Results
The Through analyzing the empirical evidence, the first hypothesis has been proven. In the fourteen joint ventures that I investigated, foreign investors trend to expand their shareholding through continuously investment and some of them apparently tend to transfer to wholly foreign owned enterprise. These findings are consistent with the research hypothesis. (Table 2) During my study, I found that foreign partners normally adopted dominant equity ownership for providing them with the control power in the board governance. Usually, the member of board is correlated with partners' equity ownership in IJVs. When foreign equity ownership increased, the percentage of foreign director in total directors was also increased. This empowers the foreign partners to exert more power in making strategic direction. If the Chinese partner has different opinion regarding some issue and they cannot get compromise, then the foreign partner might select to wholly take over the IJV and operates as WFOE. Case two is this regard. Before German partner purchased the equity shareholdings from Chinese partner, Chinese partner had different viewpoint in terms of marketing strategy. They could not reach an agreement, the German partner eventually decide to gradually buy this joint venture from its Chinese partner.
In the meantime, for some joint ventures with non-changed ownership structure, the stability of ownership structures does not necessarily mean the foreign partners are not willing to pursue more ownership percentage, but might partially because of they have already possess the dominant power in governing the joint ventures and making strategic decision. Sometimes, it may due to the unsuccessful renegotiation with their Chinese partners or for the reason of obtaining some local advantages. 
Discussions and Conclusions
Overall, this empirical study presents two propositions: (a) dominantly governing by one partner is better than shared governance mechanism; the foreign partners' advantages in capital and technology will lead to the dominant governing power exerted by foreign partner. This is particularly applicable for successfully operated Sino-foreign joint ventures; and (b) WFOEs present competitive advantages in terms of minimizing governing cost, therefore wholly foreign owned enterprise became preferable FDI entry mode and IJVs' ongoing transformation mode. In the meantime, even if for some foreign investor, the initial transaction cost related to local disadvantages was not higher than the cost arisen by remoteness governance, temporarily using IJVs for accessing Chinese market is the only way. Although China liberalized its FDI policy since 1979, wholly foreign owned enterprise was only emerged after 1990s and it is still limited in some industries. For instance, currently the wholly owned foreign enterprises are still not allowed in automobile industry by Chinese government. Therefore, IJVs becomes a convenient vehicle for foreign companies to access into Chinese market at the initial stage. After a decade development, their technical advantages have been widely accepted in Chinese market. Then they began to expand in China by using more profitable and low governing cost approach, such as WFOEs.
In term of why foreign investors can achieve dominant equity ownership and in the extreme case the Chinese partners are squeezed out from ownership structure, i.e. IJVs transform to WFOEs. Such phenomenon can be expressed by using 'Bargaining Power Theory'. The Chinese partners's advantages, such as local expertise, network, government relation (Guanxi) can be gradually grasped by foreign partners through learn-by-doing approach. But their disadvantages, such as lack of capital, technological weakness, and management skills are difficult to be made up. It is especially the case when the foreign partners intentionally protect/hide the use of technologies for avoiding 'knowledge spillover' in relation to shared management. Then unbalanced bargaining power exists following the ongoing operation, and eventually leads to foreign partners' advantages in achieving dominant equity ownership control.
Throughout analyzing the cases, some implications for the future IJVs' governance can be reached as: 1) Followed the highly developed Chinese economy and continuous foreign direct investment, IJVs will consistently present an adoptable approach as the first-time market entry mode, but to avoid governing weakness, a dominant or majority foreign equity ownership will be preferable; 2) The successful joint ventures' practice will accelerate the foreign partners' eagerness of pursuing dominant power in corporate governance at IJVs; and their advantages in capital and technology will encourage them to achieve such goal; 3) Wholly foreign owned enterprise (WFOE) will become more preferable FDI mode instead of joint venture mode due to its advantages of avoiding duplicate accountability; and some successful IJVs will continuously to choose transforming to WFOEs; 4) Following the market economy system deepening, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China will gradually loss their advantages in government protection; accordingly they will loss ongoing bargaining power when they renegotiate with foreign partners. Hence, such situation will continuously discourage SOEs to achieve the dominant governing power in IJVs.
Further Research
Several limitations are inherently existed in this research. Firstly, due to its small sample size and geographical limitation, the generalizability of this research needs to be further confirmed. Secondly, foreign directors and managers in IJVs are still sensitive for accepting interview by a Chinese, therefore unbalanced interviewees representing different partners exist. Although the author minimizes the biased opinion from Chinese interviewees, it might still limit the findings as the foreign partner's viewpoint may not be sufficiently stressed. 
